1 This paper is a slightly revised version of a chapter in Eckhardt 2011a (more in particular, chapter 6, pp. 185-217).
Introduction
During the last two decades, the number of manufacturers in the European Union (EU) that have outsourced (part of their) production to Asia has increased enormously. At the same time there are also still plenty of firms that produce their products in the EU. These two groups of firms usually have very different trade policy preferences. As the first type of firms benefit from the inflow of products made in Asia, they would normally prefer liberal EU trade policies vis-à-vis Asian Countries. For the second type of firms the net result of increased EU trade with Asia is overall detrimental and they are, therefore, expected to favour the imposition of trade restrictive measures against Asian imports. This division often leads to intense judicial and political bickering between the two opposing sides.
This paper focuses on one of those sectors in the EU being confronted with increased imports from Asia and, as a result, with repeated political battles among those benefiting and those hurt by external trade:
the EU bicycle sector. In particular, the paper looks at two instances of such strife, which both revolved The paper aims at investigating the politics of these two anti-dumping proceedings in detail. To this end, it first focuses on the supply chain of the EU bicycle sector, in order to show which type of firms are active in this sector and to indicate what their interests are with respect to the debates on the trade restrictive measures on Chinese and Vietnamese bicycle imports. It then formulates theoretical expectations regarding the political behaviour of these different bicycle firms during the two anti-dumping proceedings.
Subsequently, the paper tests whether these expectations are correct, by providing a detailed analysis of the role of societal interests during the anti-dumping processes. The paper wraps up with some concluding remarks on the political strategies of import-competing-and import-dependent firms in the EU bicycle sector in general and during the debates on the anti-dumping measures against China and
Vietnam more in particular. In this final section, the paper also compares the bicycle sector to some other goods producing sectors in the EU.
Introducing the EU bicycle sector
In order to identify the different types of bicycle firms in the EU and identify their respective interests with respect to the inflow of Chinese and Vietnamese bikes, this paper starts with an overview of the supply chain of the bicycle sector. In essence the (simplified) supply chain of the bicycle sector is similar to many other goods producing sectors and consists of three phases. First, a pre-manufacturing phase in which research, design and development takes place. Second, the manufacturing phase in which the product is produced. It is important to note that in the manufacturing phase a distinction should be made between, on the one hand, the production of the frame and other bicycle parts (e.g., derailleurs, forks, rims, hubs, and wheels) and, on the other hand, an assembly operation in which the bicycle components are joined with the frame resulting in a finished product (Ulrich et al. 1998) . A firm has to decide in this phase whether it wants to do the production of the parts and the assembly in its own factor(ies)y, or whether it is better to outsource one or both of the operations. What is more, the firm has to decide if the production (outsourced or not) will take place domestically or in a foreign country. All these decisions are typically based on labour costs, quantity/quality of the production and delivery time. The final phase of the supply chain is the post-manufacturing phase, consisting of price setting, marketing and selling to consumers.
The selling process can take place either at an outlet or store owned by the producer in question or indirectly through a retailer. The latter option is the most widely used strategy in the bicycle sector.
In the EU bicycle production supply chain both firms that compete with imports, as well as firms that depend on income generated by importing bikes into the domestic market are active.
The import-competing firms
The European import-competing bicycle firms are pre-dominantly located in a limited number of EU countries (see figure 1 ) and there are three big producer groups which produce the bulk of the European bicycles: 3 (1) Accell Group (the Netherlands) which owns well-known brands like Batavus, Sparta and Koga; (2) Cycleurope (a French company owned by the Italy-based Grimaldi Group) producing, among other brands, Bianchi-, Gitane-and Crescent bikes; and (3) Derby Cycle Corporation (Germany)
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The import-dependent firms
The group of import-dependent firms in the bicycle sector pre-dominantly consists of retailers. As mentioned in the previous section, import-dependent manufacturers do exist when we look at bicycle components, but not so much when it comes to the importation of whole bikes (i.e. the focus of this paper) as most European producers assemble their bikes in Europe. Import-dependent bicycle retailers can be divided into three broad groups. 
The argument
As has become clear from the previous section, the combination of increased import-competition from China and Vietnam -and the fact that anti-dumping duties on Chinese bicycles were about to be lifted in 2005 -made that import-competing bicycle firms in the EU had a clear incentive to demand the imposition of trade restrictive measures on bicycles from these two countries. Some firms that depend on bicycle imports were, in turn, concerned that such measures could seriously harm their trade interests.
The question this section seeks to answer is whether the circumstances -during the period investigated in this paper -were such that these different societal interests were able to overcome their collective action problems (Olson 1965) and defend their respective trade interests in the political arena.
In order for societal interests to surmount collective action impediments, both their "expected benefit of collective action", as well as their "capacity to act collectively," should be high. The expected benefit of collective action is defined here as the total additional benefits firms expect to receive from their political activities rather than adjusting to changed market conditions. The expected benefit of collective political action is thus treated here as a function of adjustment, because a firm that is able to reach its goal -i.e.
fend off-or at least decrease potential losses -through political mobilization does not have to adjust to the changing market conditions (Hathaway 1998 ). Yet when firms decide on political action they do not only take into account the benefit side of the calculation -i.e. "the goods [they] hope to receive or the ills they hope to avoid by taking political action" (Alt et al. 1996, p. 695 of the political mobilization itself. Although a firm may be able to act individually, the sheer majority of firms are unable to run a political campaign without the help of other firms in their sector, therefore it usually takes "collective" effort to mobilize politically. The costs of such collective political action are usually high and only certain groups of firms have the capacity to pay these costs. In what follows I will indicate whether or not import-competing-and import-dependent bicycle firms in the EU had a high expected benefit of collective action and a high capacity to act collectively during the two trade episodes studied in this paper.
Import-competing firms
Let us first look at the role of import-competing bicycle firms. Did they have a high expected benefit of collective political action and a high capacity to act collectively?
The expected benefit of collective action. As table 1 Vietnam increased even with 69% in that same period (see table 1 ). The increase of Chinese imports is particularly remarkable, as Chinese bikes have been subject to import duties ever since the beginning of the 1990s and in 2000 these duties were extended and increased to 30.6%.
Despite the increased import-competition, however, production in Europe itself increased as well in the last decade (see table 1 ). There are two reasons for this. First of all, European firms have remained competitive through drastically adjusting/restructuring their production process. Many firms, for instance, have cut costs by outsourcing/relocating the production of bicycle frames and other parts to Asia.
Moreover, many firms have increased their spending on research and development and some chose to specialise in specific sectors of the market. Second, ever since the increase of imports from Asia in the course of the 1990s EU bicycle producers have successfully lobbied for measures to protect their market against, what they describe as, unfair competition (i.e. dumping). Until recently this unfair competition came mainly from China, but in the 2000-2005 period producers started to argue that also Vietnam was dumping its bicycles on the European market. There is surprisingly broad consensus among EU bicycle producers that such protective measures against unfair competition are indeed justified and needed. The reason for this consensus can be traced back to the fear that without trade barriers the EU market will go down the same route as Japan and the US. Until about 15 years ago both countries (but especially Japan) were very important bicycle producers, but as they refused to impose trade restrictive measures their markets were flooded by cheap Chinese bicycles. As a result, the bicycle production in both the US and Japan has disappeared completely. In other words, the potential benefit to the bicycle industry of mobilizing politically and trying to obtain protection was high. After all, with the examples of the US and Japan in mind where the entire domestic bicycle sector had disappeared as a result of the free inflow of foreign (mainly Chinese) bikes, most EU producers felt that refraining from lobbying in favour of (further) protection would put very heavy burdens on the industry. Moreover, adjusting to the increasing foreign competition was not really an option for them as, over the years, EU bicycle producers had already applied most of the adjustment strategies available to them. So further adjustment to their corporate strategy was not a very likely strategy during the period studied here.
The capacity to act collectively. Now let us see to what extend the import-competing firms also had the capacity to act politically. The factors that determine the capacity to act collectively are: small group size, geographical concentration and standing organizational capacity (for more details on these variables see
Eckhardt 2011a
). All three factors are positively correlated with the capacity to act collectively; thus a group of firms with a high score on these factors has a high potential capacity to act politically, whereas a low score makes it likely that group members will follow the "adjustment route."
Import-competing bicycle producers in the EU indeed only have to mobilize a limited number of firms when planning on joint political action, as the level of consolidation/concentration among them is very high. To be sure, there are quite a few producers of bicycles active on the EU market, yet most of these producers (at least the important ones) are part of one of the three earlier mentioned big bicycle producer groups Acell (e.g. Batavus, Sparta and Koga-Miyata), Cycleurope (e.g. Bianchi-, Gitane-and Crescent) and Derby Cycle Corporation (e.g. Focus, Kalkhoff and Raleigh). As the bicycle sector is notorious for its lack of reliable figures, it is difficult to find out how big the market share of these big producers is exactly.
But from interviews with people in the industry it has become clear that the majority of the bikes sold in the EU are produced by one of the brands of the "big three" and hence one can speak of a very consolidated sector.
Also the level of geographical concentration is high in the EU bicycle sector. As figure 1 shows, 70% of the European bicycle production takes place in just 6 countries: Italy (18% of total production), Germany (18%), The Netherlands (9%), Poland (8%), France (8%) and Portugal (8%). In other EU countries, bicycle production is really a marginal phenomenon. Not only is bicycle production is pre-dominantly located in just a few countries, also within these countries bicycles are produced only at a limited number of locations. In other words, it is fair to say that bicycle production in the EU is geographically concentrated.
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The third and final factor determining the capacity of societal actors to act politically is their standing organizational capacity. The standing organizational capacity of import-competing bicycle producers in the EU is relatively high. Montgommery's response on his forced resignations was illustrative for the growing divide between the two associations: "Today there is a strong division of opinion within COLIBI both for and against the fact that the COLIBI President is also the Chairman of EBMA. The attitude of certain members who do not agree with the dual presidencies is, in essence, a position against the EBMA role in monitoring imports and taking action when appropriate. This is a relatively new phenomenon and reflects the growing influence of importers in the membership." From that moment on EBMA is the association mainly defending the interests of firms hurt by imports, while COLIBI usually refrains from taking a strong stance as its members have contrasting opinions on this topic.
In sum, as a result of an increased influx of Chinese and Vietnamese bikes and the potential lifting of duties on Chinese bikes, EU bicycle producers faced a clear threat to their material interests in the years prior to 2005. As both the "expected benefit of political mobilization" as well as "the capacity to act politically" were high, import-competing bicycle firms were confronted with a situation in which the benefits of political mobilization clearly outweighed the costs. It is therefore expect that they would choose political mobilization over adjustment both in case of Chinese-and Vietnamese bike imports (see tables 3a and 3b for a summary).
Import-dependent firms
Also import-dependent firms in the EU were confronted with a potential threat to their material interests.
The debates on the anti-dumping measures against Chinese and Vietnamese bicycles led to a fear for rising import prices and, in turn, to lower profits. The question is whether the expected benefit of collective action and their capacity to act collectively were high enough to spur political mobilization (for a summary of the argument see tables 3a and 3b)?
The expected benefit of collective action. As argued elsewhere , the expected benefit of political mobilization for import-dependent firms is captured by two factors. First, the level of importdependence. That is, in case a firm depends heavily on the imports affected by trade restrictions, there is a potential benefit of political action. Import-dependence is particularly high when (a) the imports affected by the trade restrictive measures make up a large share of the current supply of the firm, and (b) foreign or domestic substitutes are only available in lesser quantity/quality and/or at higher prices. Conversely, if firms depend less heavily on the import of these goods and/or have substitutes to fall back on, the expected benefit of political mobilization is low and, therefore, the firm in question is most likely to opt for adjustment. The second factor determining the expected benefit of collective action is the ease with which a firm can adjust to changing market conditions, as well as the costs related to adjustment. If a firm has a lot of time to adjust its corporate strategy it may be more feasible and less costly to do so than in case adjustments have to be implemented in a much shorter timeframe. Therefore, it is expected that when firms are confronted with a threat to their material interests that requires a quick response, collective political action is a more obvious response than in the situation that firms have more time to react.
Let us first look at the level of import-dependence of EU bicycle importers. As the anti-dumping proceedings studied here were aimed at both China and Vietnam these are the two countries to look at. This means that the scale advantages China has in many sectors play much less of a role in the bicycle sector and, therefore, producers in other countries can compete more easily with Chinese manufacturers.
Another reason for the less dominant position of China in the bicycle sector is that, ever since the beginning of the 1990s, Chinese bicycle imports have been subject to severe import duties, which has forced companies to source from other countries as well. In other words, substitutes for Chinese bicycle imports are readily available. What is more, table 2 reveals that there are no big price differences between bicycles produced in China and many other Asian countries 17 and the quality of the produced bikes in these other countries is very similar too. In other words, when being confronted with trade restrictions on Chinese bicycle imports, firms have substitutes to fall back on and hence it should be not too difficult for importers to switch to a supplier in another country. Moreover, for quite a few bicycle importers (especially the supermarkets) bikes are only one of the many products they sell, so it would not hurt them substantially when they decide to stop selling bikes if confronted with import duties.
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The situation with respect to trade dependence and Vietnamese bikes was different. In the period studied here, mainly Independent Bicycle Dealers (IBDs) relied heavily on bicycle imports from Vietnam.
According to IBD-representatives interviewed, Vietnamese firms were the only ones that were able to 17 Notable exceptions being Vietnam and Taiwan. 18 Interview Gent, Belgium, 25 January 2010.
produce the specific bikes the European dealers demanded which, in terms of price and quality, fell exactly between the low-end bikes produced by producers in China, the Philippines, Indonesia and
Thailand and the high-end bikes produced in Taiwan and Europe (see table 2 ). So, as foreign or domestic substitutes for Vietnamese bicycle imports were only available in lesser quality or at higher prices, the import-dependence of IBDs in case of Vietnamese bicycle imports was high in the period studied here.
What is also important when analyzing the expected benefit of political mobilization is the time firms have to adjust to the changed market conditions. If a firm has a lot of time to adjust its corporate strategy it may be more feasible and less costly to do so than in case adjustments have to be implemented in a much shorter timeframe. Therefore, it is expected that when firms face losses that require a quick response, political action is a more likely strategy than in the situation that firms have more time to react. As it usually takes a long time before policy makers decide whether or not to impose anti-dumping measures, it happens often that firms place (import) orders during an anti-dumping investigation without knowing what the outcome of an investigation will be. As a result, it happens frequently that firms order items and then later are confronted with the imposition of duties at which time it is obviously too late to switch another supplier. When you look at what happened in the bicycle sector in 2005, it is likely that importers of
Chinese bikes decided to switch to a supplier in another country well before the decision on the extension and increase of anti-dumping duties on Chinese bikes was taken. After all, they knew that over the last 15 years every time EU bicycle producers lodged a complaint against China, duties were imposed at the end of the day. So probably most importers of Chinese bikes were not confronted with duties after they ordered their bikes in China, as many simply decided on time to buy their bikes elsewhere. In case of
Vietnam the situation was different. As this was the first time that a complaint against Vietnam was lodged, importers of Vietnamese bikes were not sure at all whether or not duties were to be imposed and, therefore, they just placed their orders only to discover later that they had to pay a 30% duty on each imported bike. The capacity to act collectively. Also for import-dependent firms the capacity to act collectively is captured by group size, geographical concentration and standing organizational capacity.
At first sight there are big differences between sporting goods retail chains, supermarkets and the Independent bicycle distributors (IBDs) when it comes to group size. That is, the markets of the sporting good retail chains and supermarkets are dominated by a small number of big companies (e.g. Decathlon,
Halfords, Metro and Carrefour), so the level of consolidation is high. In the UK for example, Halfords'
share of the cycle market is 27% by value. 19 IBDs, on the other hand, are usually very small businesses and there are quite a few of them across Europe. The typical IBD is a family business, with usually no more than five employees. Clearly there are differences between EU countries in this regard: in a country like the Czech Republic IBDs are very often sole proprietorship firms, while in the Netherlands there is a trend towards more consolidation with fewer and bigger independent dealers. Still even in the Netherlands we speak of small companies. Having said that, as many IBDs are members of one of the big buying association and as these buying associations and its members in turn operate as a single company in many ways (especially when it comes to importing bicycles), the level of consolidation among
IBDs is in fact much higher than it may seem at first sight. Consequently, the collective action impediments IBDs face are easier to overcome than one may expect from a sector with so many small businesses.
In terms of geographical concentration, figure 2 shows that in most EU countries bicycle sales are very low. As a result, 70% of the European bicycle sales are generated by just 5 EU countries (Germany, France, UK, Italy and The Netherlands). Although bicycle sales within these five countries are not concentrated in specific regions, import-dependent firms are located in a limited number of areas in the EU and can, therefore, be considered as geographically concentrated. As said earlier, spatial proximity can bolster the ability of a group of firms to act collectively. Now let us turn to the standing organizational capacity of import-dependent firms. The big (sporting goods) retailers do not have their own interest association(s). A few years ago there have been discussions between (sporting goods) retailers and some big bike producers that import bicycles (such as Giant Europe) to erect a European organization of bicycle importers. Yet the parties involved did not come to an agreement about the establishment of the association because, among other reasons, quite a few import-dependent companies came to the conclusion that on many issues their interests do not differ substantially from those of import-competing producers. Even on the issue of anti-dumping duties (on whole bikes that is) some key import-dependent firms indicated that they were against an association that would lobby too heavily against the imposition of trade restrictions, as this could lead to sharp declining (selling) prices and a possible price war on the European bicycle market. The failure to come to an association of bicycle importers means that import-dependent bicycle retailers that do want to lobby against trade restrictions such as anti-dumping measures, could try to convince the Association of the As said before, an increasing number of IBDs is (also) member of one of the European buying associations. Such buying associations can in a way also be seen as an interest association representing the interests of its company members, specifically when it comes to trade related issues. After all, these associations buy (import) large quantities of bikes for all their members, which means that all these members share the same trade interests and the buying association can, in turn, lobby on their behalf when facing trade restrictions. In fact it may very well be the case that it is easier to come to a shared interest among the members of a buying association than within a formal interest association like the ETRA. Having said this, so far probably the only buying association with a strong political clout is the Zweirad Experten Gruppe (ZEG), with about 1000 member companies, so any lobbying coming from buying associations is expected to come from ZEG.
In sum, when looking at the potential of import-dependent bicycle firms to act collectively in the trade episodes studied here, a clear distinction should be made between different types of import-dependent firms as well as between their behaviour in the anti-duping case against Vietnam and the case against China (see tables 3a and 3b for a summary of the argument). On the one hand, sporting good retailers and supermarkets had a low benefit of political mobilization and, given their high level of consolidation, a relatively high capacity to act politically in both debates on the imposition of anti-dumping measures. In such a situation it is usually indeterminate whether actors can be expected to mobilize or adjust (i.e. in this case, import their bikes from another country than China or Vietnam or just accept the duties and raise the price of the bicycles), but the latter option is the most likely option. Lobbying in such a situation is possible if the group in question has a peak association at its disposal. Yet, as explained earlier, sporting good retailers and supermarkets do not have such an association.
The situation for import-dependent Independent Bicycle Distributors (IBDs) and their buying associations is much different and, as described above, there is especially a striking difference between the case against China (table 3a) and against Vietnam (table 3b) . During the case against China the expected benefit of political mobilization was relatively low, whereas the capacity to act politically was high. Under such circumstances some political activity is possible, but adjustment is often the most likely option. If lobbying does take place, it will most likely be undertaken by peak associations (FTA, Eurocommerce) who see it as their task to lobby against the imposition of import-barriers out of principle and not so much because their (firm) members urged them to act. Yet as the bicycle sector is a very small sector, peak association lobbying is unlikely. In case of anti-dumping duties against Vietnamese bikes, on the other hand, both the expected benefit of political mobilization and the capacity to act politically of IBDs and their buying associations was high. This means that, in contrast to the China-case, political mobilization against anti-dumping duties on Vietnamese bikes is a much more likely strategy.
In the next section I turn to a detailed analysis of the political role of societal interests during the debates on the EU anti-dumping measures against Chinese and Vietnamese bikes in order to test the just described (and summarized in tables 3a and 3b) propositions.
Table 3a Theoretical expectations anti-dumping measures against China
The expected benefit of collective action
Low High
The capacity to act papers presented to the Commission and member states, as well as in press releases, ETRA indicated that the anti-dumping measures "could well result in a sudden decline of Vietnamese imports into the EU as well as in a restriction of competition." ETRA warned that "such a decline cannot be compensated at short notice…in those countries, which import branded and private label bikes from Vietnam. Importers cannot move from one subcontractor to another just like that. Dealers cannot switch from one brand to another very easily." As a result, ETRA concluded that jobs in the IBD-sector were threatened and consumers could be confronted "with a restricted offer, higher prices and less choice with regard to price range." 30 Moreover, in their position paper and press releases, the ETRA argued that the EBMA failed to The second reason why they did not lobby against the imposition of anti-dumping measures on Chinese bikes was that quite a few bicycle importers were concerned that the lifting of quotas on Chinese bikes could "ruin the market." To be more precise, the removal of import duties was expected to lead a price war and, in turn, a very sharp drop (of about 30-40%) in bicycle prices all over the EU, which could (Davis 2009, pp. 9-10) . In other words, bicycle importers were responsible for more than 98% of all the official (individual company) complaints the European Commission received against the imposition of anti-dumping measures in these 23 cases.
As was the case in the earlier stages of the anti-dumping proceeding, lobbying against the imposition of duties on Chinese bicycles remained very limited. In fact, it were only Chinese producers which tried to convince the European Commission not to impose duties. According to an official of the China Bicycle Association, "Chinese enterprises are still making every effort to gain a better result." 40 The strategy of the Chinese bicycle makers was to convince European officials that China is not dumping its bikes on the European market and that the Chinese bicycle manufacturing industry is complementary to, rather than competing with, European firms as China focuses on low end products whereas the EU is producing high quality bikes. 41 It must be noted, however, that it was difficult for the Chinese bicycle manufacturers to put ample pressure on the European Commission and the member states, as Chinese public officials were not very actively defending the case of the Chinese bicycle makers. 42 There is a big difference in this regard between the anti-dumping case on bicycles studied here and similar EU-China trade disputes that took place around the same time. As the anti-dumping committee has only an advisory role, the new duties could only come into force after a vote in the Council of Ministers. That meeting took place on the 12 th of July and, as expected, the Council of Ministers indeed followed the advice from the Anti-Dumping Committee and decided to impose definitive anti-dumping duties on imports of bicycles originating in the People's Republic of China (48.5%)
as well as Vietnam (34.5%). Again, the voting pattern was as follows: 19 yes votes, 4 no votes and 2 abstentions. 45 The EU bicycle producers expressed their satisfaction with the duties on Chinese bicycles, or as an anonymous representative of the industry put it:
"There was an audible sigh of relief in the bike industry throughout Europe when it was confirmed that anti dumping duty (ADD) would be increased on China…We all know it is protectionism and if we are honest with ourselves, we know that ADD cannot continue for ever, but for now, this action largely suppresses China as a realistic source for complete bikes for Europe for the next 5
years."
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In case of the duties on Vietnamese bikes the responses from EU bicycle producers were a bit more mixed. Most producers seemed to be satisfied with the duties, yet some producers were unhappy with the duties on Vietnamese bikes as they imported (part of) their bikes from Vietnam. However, it became also clear that most of the European bicycle companies relying on imports from Vietnam had already made plans to source from other countries as soon as possible. 47 According to some reports, as soon it became clear that duties would be imposed, there were deals made between European bicycle producers and their Vietnamese suppliers to simply remove the entire production facilities (including managers and other employees) from Vietnam to other countries (most notably Cambodia, Thailand, Laos and Taiwan).
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Import-dependent IBDs, on the other hand, were unhappy with the decision to impose duties on Vietnamese bikes. For these small firms it was not that easy to simply source from another country.
Having said that, when one reads the Commission text carefully it becomes clear that one Vietnamese manufacturer got a 15.8% Anti-Dumping duty, while the rest of the Vietnamese industry was hit with a 34.5% duty. That Vietnamese company was Always/Strongman and it is no coincidence that by far its biggest European client is the German buying association ZEG. 
Concluding remarks
This paper has analyzed in detail the political and judicial fencing between those in favour and those against the imposition of trade restrictive anti-dumping measures against bicycle imports from China and
Vietnam. Given the sharp increase of bicycle imports from China and Vietnam in the years prior to 2004 and the fact in the past all their requests for anti-dumping duties on bikes were granted, it was unsurprising that import-competing bicycle firms in the EU had no problems organizing joint political action and demand the imposition of these anti-dumping duties. The request by the EBMA to reimpose and increase duties on Chinese bicycles, as well to impose duties on Vietnamese bikes, is -to put it differently -completely in line with conventional ideas on firm political mobilization.
What was surprising, however, was the response of import-dependent firms to (the imposition of) these anti-dumping measures. Especially their completely different response to the measures against China and Vietnam is interesting. At first sight, the proceedings against China and Vietnam have many things in common; still, the response of import-dependent firms was completely different. In case of the duties concerning Chinese bicycle imports there was hardly any political mobilization of import-dependent firms.
There are two reasons for this. First of all, import-dependent firms that relied most heavily on Chinese imports -sporting good retailers and supermarkets -had ample adjustment options to fall back on. Some for example, simply started importing their bikes from other countries in Asia. After all, their dependence on Chinese imports was not that big. Alternatively, firms decided to raise their prices. Again others -that is, supermarkets for which bikes are only one of the many products they sell -simply stopped selling bikes all together. A second reason for the lack of political action on the side of the import-dependent firms is that sporting good retailers and supermarkets do not have a standing organization at their disposal.
In case of the anti-dumping duties against Vietnam, on the other hand, certain type of import-dependent firms lobbied extensively and forcefully to stop the imposition of these duties. Especially Independent Bicycle Distributors (IBDs) relied heavily on the bikes that were produced in Vietnam. As foreign or domestic substitutes for Vietnamese bicycle imports were only available in lesser quality or at higher prices, the import-dependence of IBDs in case of Vietnamese bicycle imports was high. It was particularly difficult for them to find an alternative supplier given the short time-frame. Besides the high expected benefit of political mobilization IBDs also had a high capacity to act collectively. After all, most IBS are member of the European Two-wheel retail association (ETRA) and/or of one of the European buying associations (most notably ZEG). In addition, IBDs are located in a limited number of areas in the EU.
Both factors made it relatively easy for IBDs to overcome their collective action obstacles and lobby against anti-dumping duties on Vietnamese bikes.
Finally, it must be noted that the EU bicycle sector differs in some respects from other goods producing sectors in the EU, such as textile/clothing and footwear. These characteristics could also have had an influence on the interest group constellation, as well as the choice between adjustment and political mobilization of the different societal interest in the trade episodes studies here. First of all, in contrast to many other sectors in the EU, approximately half of the bicycle production is still carried out completely in the EU. In other words, the group of EU producers is not as divided as -and therefore perhaps more easy to mobilize than -sectors in which one group of firms has outsourced production and one has not (De Bièvre & Eckhardt 2011) . What is more, the fact that the group of import-dependent bicycle firms in the EU mainly consists of retailers -rather than a mix of producers and retailers -could negatively affect their political strength or the ability of the import-dependent firms to organize in the first place. A second factor that disguises the bicycle sector from some other goods producing sectors in the EU is that European bicycle importers do not depend so heavily on one or two supplying countries. In for instance
